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INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) took effect.'
In the United States, NAFTA's adoption was
by
a
strident
debate
over environmental and labor issues.2 As these
preceded
matters took center stage, however, critical issues of sovereignty and
constitutionality never received widespread public consideration. As a
transnational agreement, NAFTA necessarily involves a cession of some
traditionally domestic rights and responsibilities to transnational bodies
composed of members of each party-nation. In NAFTA, major cessions of
U.S. sovereignty are made in the agreement's dispute resolution process for
antidumping and countervailing duty cases.3 NAFTA creates a transnational
panel to hear such disputes and appeals which, for some U.S. firms,

* The author would like to thank his parents, David and Paulette Senior, his brother,
Darren Senior, and close friends, Steven Greenhut and Jim Matulis.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 298
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. The furor over environmental and labor issues culminated in two side agreements to
NAFTA. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1489; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13,
1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499.
3. NAFTA, supra note 1,art. 1904, § 1.Antidumping and countervailing duty laws are
the international equivalent of domestic laws against predatory pricing. Antidumping laws
seek to prevent exporters from "dumping" goods on the domestic market by subsidizing their
sales with high prices in their own countries. Countervailing duty laws apply when the
foreign exporter's government subsidized an industry, enabling the exporter to "dump" the
goods on the domestic market at unreasonably low prices. Demetrios G. Metropoulos,
ConstitutionalDimensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 141, 144 (1994).
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eliminates access to Article III courts.4 Some commentators have concluded
that NAFTA's dispute resolution process is thus unconstitutional, and have
proposed solutions ranging from wholesale changes in NAFTA's text to
constitutional amendment. 5 The alarm, however, is unwarranted. NAFTA's
dispute resolution process, if judicially challenged, would carry the highest
presumption of constitutionality, a presumption bolstered by the traditional
powers granted to the legislative and executive branches, and by the fact that
neither branch exceeded these traditional powers in implementing NAFTA.6
Thus, the federal courts would likely find NAFTA constitutional.
II.

NAFTA vs. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT

Prior to the adoption of the U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (CFTA)
in 1988, initial determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases
in the United States were made by the Commerce Department.7 A U.S. firm
would petition the Commerce Department if it felt that it was being harmed
by the unfair business practices of a foreign company.8 The Commerce
Department would then rule on the dispute and impose sanctions, if
4. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, § 1.
5. Metropoulos, supra note 3, at 169-70. Metropoulos' proposed amendment to Article
III reads as follows (with sections 1 through 3 of the Article remaining unchanged):
SECTION 4. Pursuant to Treaty, Congress may vest the judicial Power of the
United States, in regards to Cases and Controversies arising under the Treaties or
laws of foreign commerce, in such international Tribunals as Congress may ordain.
The Judges of such Tribunals shall hold their Offices during good Behavior
throughout the term of the related Treaty or Agreement. Their Compensation shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Judges selected by the United States to serve on international Tribunals shall
be appointed by the President, with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur.
With respect to the interpretation of United States domestic law, and of this
Constitution, the decisions of international Tribunals shall be subject to plenary
appellate review by the federal Courts. Interpretations of the law of foreign
commerce, and findings of fact, shall be subject to review for manifest error.
Nothing in this provision shall be construed to limit the power of Congress
to assign such Cases and Controversies to the federal Courts.
Id. at 172.
6. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-TRADE
AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1988).
The panel system from the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement is substantially
identical to that of NAFTA. Compare Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988,
U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281.
7. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 8. More specifically, rulings were made by the
Commerce Department's International Trade Administration and by the International Trade
Commission. Id. The CFTA's binational panel system, as previously mentioned, is
substantially identical to that of NAFTA and therefore raises identical issues of
constitutionality. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
8. Metropoulos, supra note 3, at 145.
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necessary, on the offending foreign entity.9 Final decisions on the issue
emanating from the Commerce Department were then reviewable by a series
of Article III courts.'0 Disputes were first heard by the Court of International Trade (CIT)." CIT opinions were then appealable to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), whose rulings were in turn subject
to the certiorari jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 Each of these
courts is organized under Article Ill of the U.S. Constitution, ensuring
lifetime appointments and salary guarantees for the judges who preside over
them.' 3 These guarantees, by ensuring the independence of the judiciary
from public and political pressure, are considered critical to the administration of justice in the United States. 4
In first the CFTA and then NAFTA, Article III jurisdiction over antidumping and countervailing duties is replaced with multinational panel
jurisdiction.' 5 Thus, in the United States, initial determination of antidumping and countervailing duty situations is still made by the Commerce
Department. 6 Under NAFTA, however, if the ruling of the Commerce
Department is challenged the matter is no longer reviewed by the federal
judiciary. Instead, the review is conducted by a panel comprised of five
qualified individuals, 7 none of whom have salary guarantees or lifetime
seats, chosen from a pre-established 75-person roster.' 8 To assist the panel
in resolving the conflict, the Commerce Department is required to turn over
the administrative record which it based its determination on to the panel. 9
Each nation in the dispute may choose two panelists from the roster, with the
fifth chosen by mutual agreement.2" Should the nations be unable to agree
on a final panelist in a timely manner, the two draw lots for the right to

9. Id.
10. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
14. Metropoulos, supra note 3, at 149-50. To support his argument, Metropoulos quotes
Alexander Hamilton:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute
so much as this to that independent spirit in judges which must be essential to the
faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
Id. at 150 n.77, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, § 1.
16. Id. art. 1902, § 1.
17. Id. at annex 1901.2, § 2.
18. Id. § 1.
19. Id. art. 1904, § 14.
20. Id. at annex 1901.2, § 2.
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make the final selection.2 '
Like the Article III judiciary, the panel system is endowed with a number
of procedural and appellate safeguards to ensure due process. 22 Procedurally, the panel is bound by rules based upon judicial appellate review. 23 Such
procedures include filing deadlines and service of process, content requirements for complaints and briefs, the creation of an administrative record,
and the protection of business secrets and classified government information.24
NAFTA also creates an appellate process to ensure justice. 25 The ruling
of the panel is reviewable by an extraordinary challenge committee whenever
a member of the panel is guilty of bias or misconduct, or whenever the panel
overreaches its powers or materially departs from established procedure.26
The extraordinary challenge committee is a three-person board chosen from
a fifteen-person roster whose members must be current or former federal
judges. 27 Each nation in the dispute chooses one committee member, with
the third being chosen by lot.2" Decisions by the committee represent the
final adjudication of the dispute.29
III.

NAFTA vs. ARTICLE III

Ultimately, due to differing procedural and appellate rules, NAFTA and
Article III guarantee justice in different ways. Thus, the debate arises: are
Article III safeguards so vital to ensuring justice that they cannot be
compromised, even in the name of free trade? Or are the gravity of free
trade and the safeguards built into NAFTA adequate to allow the federal
courts to defer to the panel system? Commentators have given disparate
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 1904, § 14.

23. Id. The text reads:
To implement the provisions of this Article, the parties shall adopt rules of
procedure by Jan. 1, 1994. Such rules shall be based, where appropriate, on judicial
rules of appellate procedure, and shall include rules concerning: the content and
service of requests for panels; a requirement that the competent investigating
authority transmit to the panel the administrative record of the proceeding; the
protection of business proprietary, government classified, and other privileged
information; participation by private persons; limitations on panel review to errors
alleged by the parties or private persons; filing and service; computation and
extensions of time; the form and content of briefs and other papers; pre- and posthearing conferences; motions; oral argument; requests for rehearing; and voluntary
termination of panel reviews.
24. Id.
25. Id. art. 1904, § 13.
26. Id.
27. Id. at annex 1904.13, § 1.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 3.
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answers to these questions.
In "Constitutional Dimensions of the North American Free Trade
Agreement," Demetrios G. Metropoulos concludes that the panel system is
unconstitutional.3"
Metropoulos bases his conclusion on the fact that
Congress, in the past, has justified departures from Article III on only two
grounds: first, such a deviation reduced a backlog in Article III courts; or
second, such a deviation sent certain disputes from Article III courts into
courts with highly specialized areas of expertise, such as bankruptcy
courts.3' Metropoulos doubts that either scenario applies to the panel
system.32 Desires for expediency and specialization, he argues, are already
adequately served by detailed timetables and by the Court of International
Trade.33 Moreover, NAFTA's provisions only apply to trade between
Canada, the United States, and Mexico, while antidumping and countervailing
duty disputes between the United States and other nations would still be
heard by Article III courts. Metropoulos implies that the resulting concurrent
jurisdiction of these disputes between the panel system and the federal courts
creates the unnecessary danger of inconsistent administration of justice.34
To remedy the panel system's usurpation of Article III jurisdiction,
Metropoulos suggests that panel decisions should be appealable to an Article
III court. 35 In addition, should a panel interpret a non-trade law, such as an
environmental law, in rendering its decision, its interpretation should be
reviewable by an Article III court under a de novo standard. 36 Metropoulos,
however, does not stop with modifications to free trade agreements. He
views the problem inherent in the CFTA, and later NAFTA, as part of a
trend toward ceding national sovereignty to transnational decision-making
bodies 37 - a trend which calls for an amendment to Article 111.38 His
revised Article III would specify which issues can be subject to international
adjudication, who can appoint American members to transnational
bodies,
39
and how such bodies will interact with the U.S. judiciary.

30. Metropoulos, supra note 3, at 142.
31. Id. at 167.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 160.
35. Id. at 169. Metropoulos argues that at the very least NAFTA's provision allowing
sitting U.S. judges to be panelists should be stricken from the treaty. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 169-70.
38. Id. at 170, stating "[w]e must confront the sacrifice of sovereignty head-on: If we are
to have transnational adjudication, we must amend Article III to incorporate and govern that
choice." Metropoulos further stated that "an amendment to Article III is desirable in a
pragmatic sense, as the best means towards the worthy goals of transnational adjudication.
A crucial ingredient in any international agreement is legal certainty." Id.
39. Id.
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Other commentators, however, see the panel system as constitutional, and
therefore see no need for drastic constitutional remedies. In its Report on the
CFTA's binational panel system, the House of Representatives concluded that
the system is constitutional.40 The House, after hearing copious testimony
from constitutional scholars on both sides of the debate, reasoned that
because the panels are the product of extensive cooperation between the
legislative and executive branches, they carry a heavy presumption of
constitutionality. 41 Furthermore, responsibility for international affairs is
textually committed to the executive branch in the U.S. Constitution,42 while
regulation of international commerce is textually committed to the legislature. 43 Given the international context of free trade, the House concluded
that the panel system was "on strong constitutional ground." Finally, the
House noted that the panel system only changes the institutions a firm can
turn to to seek justice, and does not eliminate due process altogether.4 To
the contrary, the House explicitly stated its satisfaction with the panel
system's rules of procedure and rules of ethics for panelists.46
The House also expressed its satisfaction with the CFTA's implementing
legislation, which allowed constitutional claims involved in a panel dispute
to still be heard by Article III courts.4 7 By giving constitutional claimants
access to the Article III judiciary in the CFTA and later NAFTA, Congress
reduced the panel review system to a purely administrative process for trade
disputes.4 8 Such a scheme safeguards fundamental constitutional rights and
increases the likelihood that NAFTA will be ruled constitutional.
IV.

THE PANEL SYSTEM: A CONSTITUTIONAL, SCHEME

Given the importance of international trade and the trend toward
transnational bodies, the issues raised by NAFTA's anti-dumping and
countervailing duty provisions promise to confound nations for years to
come. In this sense, perhaps Metropoulos is right: the United States should

40. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 2. This report deals with the binational panel
system of the CFTA. The CFTA's panel scheme is substantially identical to that of NAFTA,
and therefore the issues discussed in the report are germane to NAFTA. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
41. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 4.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
43. Id. art. I, § 8.
44. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 4.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 12-13.
48. Id. at 10. The Report also stated that "the cases to be reviewed by the panels are
'public rights,' and thus of lesser importance than the assertion of the civil or constitutional
right." Id. at 12.
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resolve the issue permanently via constitutional amendment. 49 However,
fundamental flaws in Metropoulos' argument, even beyond the interpretive
nightmare of a drastically revised Article III, suggest that such a course of
action is unnecessary, and that the Constitution is already capable of
accommodating expanding transnational powers.
Metropoulos' argument that the concurrent jurisdiction of the panel
system and the federal courts will create inconsistent administration of justice
has little merit. Under the current federal scheme, Article III courts have
more than 200 years of experience in dealing with the issues and problems
of concurrent jurisdiction. Having accommodated the state courts for so
long, the presence of a concurrent transnational court should not present
unacceptable difficulty.
Metropoulos also fails to account for two factors found in NAFTA's
implementing legislation. First, the legislation permits the assertion of facial
constitutional challenges to the panel system in Article III courts.50 Second,
the legislation permits suits in Article III courts asserting that the underlying
anti-dumping or countervailing duty law is unconstitutional, or that in the
instant case there has been a denial of due process.5 ' The implementing
legislation has thereby allowed Article III courts to hear all constitutional
issues which might arise in the antidumping or countervailing duty context.
This ensures U.S. firms constitutional treatment even when their case is
before a panel, thereby bolstering constitutionality arguments in favor of
NAFTA's scheme.52 By allowing constitutional issues to be heard by
Article III judges, Congress reduced antidumping and countervailing duty
disputes to "public rights."53 Such rights are defined as administrative
matters arising between the government and someone subject to governmental
control, and as purely executive and legislative matters, they are no longer
required to be litigated before Article I judges.5

49. Metropoulos, supra note 3, at 170.
50. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 12, stating "[t]he legislation permits the assertion
of facial constitutional challenges to the review scheme proposed in the [CFTA]."
51. Id. at 13, stating:
The second type of constitutional challenge permitted by the implementing
legislation involves those that assert that there has been a denial of constitutional
rights either because the underlying antidumping or countervailing duty statute is unconstitutional or because as a result of unique circumstances in an individual
antidumping or countervailing duty case there has been a denial of due process.
52. Id., stating "[a]n individual case alleging denial of due process is also likely to fail
because of the procedural protections already in place in the [panel system] and the
implementing legislation."
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 8. The REPORT further states that the only constitutional due process
requirement for protecting public rights is affording the parties an opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 12. The REPORT continues: "Private
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Finally, Metropoulos' stance is eroded by the inviolability of the House's
argument concerning the authority of the executive and legislative branches.
It is well established that when the executive and legislature act in concert
to effect policy, the policy carries the highest presumption of
constitutionality."5
Moreover, in the case of NAFTA, Congress was
attempting to act within the scope of its power over commerce, and the
executive branch was acting under the auspices of its power over foreign
affairs.5 6 Thus, to strike down all or part of NAFTA because the agreement
encroaches on Article III is to encroach on both Articles I and II. Such a
result is less constitutionally acceptable than narrowing Article IlI jurisdiction.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whenever a nation cedes a portion of its authority in the name of
transnational cooperation, there is bound to be some anxiety.5 7 Concerns
about fairness and justice are reasonable. The general tenor of Metropoulos'
article should be heeded: the United States should not rush headlong into
transnational organizations without first considering the implications
membership has for U.S. sovereignty.5 " Yet in assessing the risks of
membership, the flexibility of the U.S. judiciary and the proper functions of
the executive and legislative branches should not be forgotten. In the words
of one scholar, "[w]hile some aspects of the [panel system] are unique...
overall it fits within the traditions of the foreign relations law of the United
States, both with respect to dispute settlement and with respect to legislation
concerning international trade."5 9 In the case of NAFTA, the absence of

persons will have the right to fully participate in the panel process, including appearances, oral
argument, and written submissions ....
Finally, the availability of resort to extraordinary
challenge committees should act to cure aberrant behavior by the panelists."
55. Id. at 7-8, quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981):
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from
Congress, he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by the
Congress. In such a case the executive action would be supported by the strongest
presumptions and the widest of latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who may attack it.
Regan, 453 U.S. at 668.
56. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 7.
57. Metropoulos states that the issue "transcends supply and demand, with implications
that cannot be measured in econometric statistics." Metropoulos, supra note 3, at 141.
58. Id. at 142, stating that "[i]nternational trade now goes beyond the clerical domain of
customs officers and tariff tables, and embraces serious social, political, and even
constitutional concerns. Truly free trade, with supervision by transnational institutions, entails
hard choices about national sovereignty and constitutional reform."
59. H.R. REP. No. 816, supra note 6, at 5, quoting letter from Professor Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, New York University School of Law, to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier
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Article III guarantees of fairness and due process does not in itself invalidate
the panel system. NAFTA has its own guarantees for justice and fairness,
and the cooperation between the executive and legislature in implementing
the panel system creates a heavy presumption that NAFTA's guarantees are
adequate.

(Apr. 11, 1988). Id. at 2.
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